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Tax Fraud and Selective Law Enforcement
Rita de la Feria∗
This article presents a new conceptual framework for research into
tax fraud and law enforcement. Informed by research approaches
from across tax law, public economics, criminology, criminal justice,
economics of crime, and regulatory theory, it assesses the effectiveness,
and the legitimacy, of current approaches to combating tax fraud,
bringing new dimensions to previously identified trends in crime control.
It argues that, whilst the last decade has witnessed a significant
intensification of measures that purportedly target tax fraud, preference
has been consistently given to enforcement measures that maximize
revenue gains rather than combat the fraud itself, even where the effect
is to aggravate the non-revenue costs of tax fraud. These developments
demonstrate a significant shift from tax fraud suppression to tax fraud
management. The article concludes that this shift not only undermines
tax equity and overall tax compliance, but also leads to selective tax
enforcement, thus representing a significant risk to the rule of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax fraud is, by its very nature, difficult to measure. Although tax
administrations commonly present estimations of the levels of fraud, the
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methods used are rarely made public, vary widely, and are often unsuitable.1
There is little doubt, however, over its significance, with EU estimates
reaching up to €1 trillion in revenue loss per year.2 In countries such as the
UK that do publish official aggregate estimates of non-compliance – usually
referred to as the tax gap3 – the estimated revenue lost to fraud runs into the
many billions of euros.4 Although these measurements cannot be taken to be
fully accurate,5 and the gap is a measure of non-compliance in general rather
than of revenue loss due to fraud and evasion specifically, these figures are
indicative of the scale of the problem. In addition to the official numbers,
recent tax scandals involving evidence of widespread tax fraud, such as the
Swiss Leaks6 and the Panama Papers,7 not only presented concrete evidence
of the extent of the problem8 but equally increased public awareness of it.
Given its significance, it is unsurprising that in the period following the
economic and financial crisis in 2008/2009, when EU member states’ priority
was to ensure fiscal consolidation and public concerns over austerity measures
mounted, attention turned more intensively towards tax fraud.9 This was
1 IMF, Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance (2015)
IMF Staff Paper, at 10. See also N. Artavanis et al., ‘Measuring Income Tax Evasion
Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece’ (2016) 131 Q. J. of Economics 739; H.
G. Petersen et al., ‘Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion, and Transfer Fraud: Definition,
Measurement, and Data Problems’ (2010) 24 International Economic J. 421.
2 European Commission, ‘Huge Sums Are Being Lost due to Tax Evasion
and Avoidance’ (n.d.), at <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-
fraud-tax-evasion/a-huge-problem_en>.
3 OECD, Tax Administration 2017: Comparative Information on OECD and Other
Advanced and Emerging Economies (2017) 181 et seq.
4 HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2019 Edition: Tax Gap Estimates for 2017–2018
(2019), at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/820979/Measuring_tax_gaps_2019_edition.pdf>.
5 Criticisms of the measurement are summarized in K. Yiallourou, ‘The Limitations of
the VAT Gap Measurement’ (2019) 28 EC Tax Rev. 196.
6 D. Leigh et al., ‘HSBC Files Show How Swiss Bank Helped Clients Dodge Taxes
and Hide Millions’ Guardian, 8 February 2015, at <https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-expose-swiss-bank-clients-dodge-taxes-hide-
millions>.
7 L. Harding, ‘What Are the Panama Papers? A Guide to History’s Biggest Data
Leak’ Guardian, 5 April 2016, at <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/
what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers>. See also J. Londono-Velez and
J. Avila-Mahecha, ‘Can Wealth Taxation Work in Developing Countries? Quasi-
Experimental Evidence from Colombia’ (2018) working paper. Whilst the leak
revealed a range of potentially questionable tax practices, this article concentrates
solely on tax fraud rather than avoidance or planning, as these raise significantly
different legal questions.
8 A. Alstadserter et al., ‘Tax Evasion and Inequality’ (2017) NBER Working Paper
23772. See also G. Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax
Havens (2015).
9 On the impact of the crisis on tax policy, see generally R. C. Christensen and M.
Hearson, ‘The New Politics of Global Tax Governance: Taking Stock a Decade
after the Financial Crisis’ (2019) 26 Rev. of International Political Economy 1068;
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particular evident with regards to value-added tax (VAT) due to its revenue-
gathering potential10 and its perceived neutrality with respect to economic
growth.11 The policy commitment to combating tax fraud seems, prima facie,
to have worked: available estimates for developed countries indicate a general
narrowing of compliance gaps,12 even within VAT, where this was not initially
the case. In the UK, for example, the overall tax gap has decreased by nearly 2
per cent, and the VAT gap by nearly 4 per cent, between 2005 and 2016.13 This
decrease has been generally welcomed, with even critics accepting the official
explanation that it is the result of increased compliance and lower levels of
fraud,14 despite acknowledging potential distortions.15 This is, however, a
false equivalence. Certain measures may eliminate the revenue costs of the
fraud, yet not address the fraud itself. As discussed below, a key example
would be when additional revenue is collected from non-fraudulent businesses
to compensate for what has been lost through fraud, by imposing what is
known as third-party liability. In this case, the decrease in the gap may be
partly attributed not to the reduction of fraud per se but to the implementation
of these measures, which merely maximize revenue collection.
This article presents a novel conceptual framework for understanding
the tax fraud phenomenon, informed by research insights from across
various disciplines – tax law, public economics, criminology, criminal justice,
economics of crime, and regulatory theory – thereby breaking with the
single- or dual-discipline orthodoxy that has often characterized previous
studies. It then reflects upon both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of anti-
fraud practices by establishing how, through prioritizing short-term revenue
gains over the elimination of tax fraud, they: unavoidably lead to selective
tax enforcement; damage the neutrality and equity of overall tax systems;
decrease the long-term efficiency of those same tax systems, even where
there are short-term efficiency gains; and, ultimately, undermine the rule of
law. Although these tendencies are evident across different taxes, from tax
I. Grinberg, ‘The New International Tax Diplomacy’ (2017) 104 Georgetown Law J.
61. For a detailed analysis of the various exogenous and endogenous factors at play as
regards anti-fraud policy, see Section IV.
10 Whilst VAT accounted for over 18 per cent of total tax revenues of EU member states,
in some member states it amounted to as much 50 per cent of total tax revenue;
see European Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union: 2017 Edition
(2017), at 20–21 and 159, at <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/
files/taxation_trends_report_2017.pdf>.
11 R. de la Feria, ‘Blueprint for Reform of VAT Rates in Europe’ (2015) 43 Intertax 154,
at 162.
12 IMF, op. cit, n. 1, at 13.
13 HMRC, op. cit, n. 4.
14 N. Gemmel and J. Hasseltine, ‘Taxpayer’s Behavioural Responses and Measures of
Tax Compliance “Gaps”: A Critique and a New Measure’ (2014) 35 Fiscal Studies
275.
15 IMF, op. cit., n. 1, at 7 and 13.
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amnesties in income taxes16 to third-party liability in excise duties, and across
different (EU and non-EU) countries, VAT is used as a case study, drawing
evidence primarily from European countries’ practices.
The article is divided into three sections. Section II introduces the new
conceptual framework for understanding tax fraud, using VAT as a case study;
it presents a broad typology of VAT fraud and considers the various costs
of tax fraud. Section III discusses existing measures to tackle tax fraud. In
particular, enforcement developments such as penalties, legal formalism, and
third-party tax liability are considered in terms of related criminal justice
approaches, and the theoretical framework of aggravated responsibilization
is introduced as part of a proposed re-conceptualization of law enforcement
strategies in the context of tax fraud. Section IV concludes by considering the
factors that prompted this policy shift from tax fraud suppression to tax fraud
management, as well as the risks that this shift presents, both in terms of the
potential creation of a moral hazard that may further propagate tax fraud, and
crucially also through the establishment of selective tax enforcement, which
undermines the rule of law.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE TAX FRAUD PHENOMENON
VAT, like any other type of tax, is vulnerable to fraud. Traditionally, the
inclusion of consumption taxes in the tax mix is seen as spreading the risk
of enforcement,17 and VAT is perceived as less susceptible to fraud than its
principal alternative and economic equivalent, the retail sales tax (RST).
This comparative advantage is attributable to the multi-stage nature of VAT,
which requires the tax to be collected on business-to-business transactions,
but also allows businesses to credit the VAT paid on their purchases (inputs)
against the VAT charged on their sales (outputs). This multi-stage collection
process ensures that: (1) buyers of intermediate goods have opposing
interests to the sellers, thus reducing the scope for evasion;18 and (2) the
risk of evasion is spread across the different elements of the production
chain. The characteristics of VAT therefore ensure that it falls, by nature,
into the framework of situational crime prevention: designing the tax in a
manner that prevents fraud from occurring.19 However, whilst the incentive
16 R. C. Bayer et al., ‘The Occurrence of Tax Amnesties: Theory and Evidence’ (2015)
125 J. of Public Economics 70; K. Baer and E. Le Borge, Tax Amnesties: Theory,
Trends, and Some Alternatives (2008).
17 R. Broadway et al., ‘Towards a Theory of the Direct–Indirect Tax Mix’ (1994) 55 J.
of Public Economics 71.
18 A. Sandmo, ‘The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View’ (2005) 58 National
Tax J. 643, at 654.
19 P. Alldridge, Criminal Justice and Taxation (2017), at 34. See also D. Middleton and
M. Levi, ‘Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organised Crime, Lawyers and the Regulation
of Legal Services’ (2015) 55 Brit. J. of Criminology 647.
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for traders to ensure that suppliers provide them with credit-allowing invoices
gives some guarantee that VAT is, to some extent, self-enforceable,20 it is
also true that this self-enforceability is somewhat illusory.21 First, there is
some evidence that ‘bad production chains’ can form;22 second, and more
importantly perhaps, even where bad chains do not form, self-enforceability
does not cover all aspects of the production chain and it is precisely at these
points, when the elements of self-enforceability are absent, that fraud tends to
occur.
Tax fraud can be largely defined as behaviour aimed at obtaining an
unlawful tax advantage and/or causing unlawful tax loss.23 Although the
means of obtaining such an advantage vary greatly, as do the potential costs
resulting from the fraud, there is often a failure to grasp the complexity of
the phenomenon, which is then reflected in the inadequacy of the measures
adopted to combat it. Understanding the phenomenon of VAT fraud is
therefore a necessary preliminary step towards critical assessment of measures
to address it.
1. A typology of VAT fraud
There have been a number of attempts to provide a typology of VAT fraud.
Some have focused on the distinction between those types of fraud that
are common to all taxes and those that are specific to VAT,24 some have
concentrated on the differences between the types of perpetrators,25 and
some have concentrated on chronology.26 Given the constant mutations in
behavioural patterns, providing a definitive typology of VAT fraud is, by
its nature, difficult. However, it is argued that the main distinction, which
applies to tax fraud more generally, is that between evasion and organized
20 D. Pomeranz, ‘No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement
in the Value Added Tax’ (2015) 105 Am. Economic Rev. 2539. See also M.
Waseem, ‘Information, Asymmetric Incentives, or Withholding? Understanding the
Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax’ (2018) Oxford University Centre for Business
Taxation Working Paper WP 18/08.
21 M. Keen and S. Smith, ‘VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can
Be Done?’ (2006) 59 National Tax J. 861.
22 A. de Paula and J. A. Scheinkman, ‘Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects and
Informality’ (2010) 2 Am. Economic J.: Macroeconomics 195.
23 For a definition of fraud generally, see M. Levi and J. Burrows, ‘Measuring the Impact
of Fraud in the UK’ (2008) 48 Brit. J. of Criminology 293.
24 Keen and Smith, op. cit., n. 21.
25 UK National Audit Office, Tackling Tax Fraud: How HMRC Responds to Tax
Evasion, the Hidden Economy, and Criminal Attacks (2015), at <https://www.
nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Tackling-tax-fraud-how-HMRC-responds-
to-tax-evasion-the-hidden-economy-and-criminal-attacks.pdf>.
26 M. Lamensch, ‘Fraude TVA et Commerce Digital’ in La Fraude à la TVA, ed. C.
Herbain (2017) 127.
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Figure 1. A typology of VAT fraud
fraud. Although this distinction does connect with the type of perpetrator,27
its primary focus is on the means used to obtain an unlawful tax advantage.
Evasion results from either informality or part-time crime, and can be defined
as the deliberate omission, concealment, or misrepresentation of information
to reduce VAT liability. Organized fraud, on the other hand, involves
coordinated and systematic actions, with varying levels of sophistication
and organization, towards obtaining an unlawful VAT financial advantage.28
These two behavioural types are also typified by divergent characteristics in
terms of perpetrators, geographical reach, methods, and costs. Evasion tends
to be carried out by small companies,29 operating at a national level – although
no longer exclusively so – who take advantage of national administrative
limitations and distinctions in the tax base. Organized fraud tends to be
carried out by criminal gangs operating at a transnational level, who take
advantage of tax authorities’ enforcement limitations regarding cross-border
trade. These two categories of VAT fraud also give rise to different types
of costs. Organized fraud tends to result in higher levels of revenue loss
and a subsidy to organized crime networks, whereas evasion tends to have
a bigger impact upon tax inequity and creates an uneven playing field. These
distinctions are summarized in Table 1.
Both evasion and organized fraud can be further subdivided into various
sub-types, as set out in Figure 1. It should be noted that these types/sub-
types are indicative rather than rigidly distinct; there are reports of hybrid
27 M. Levi, ‘Serious Tax Fraud and Non-Compliance: A Review of Evidence on
the Differential Impact of Criminal and Non-Criminal Proceedings’ (2010) 9
Criminology & Public Policy 493.
28 Organized fraud is also evident within income taxation; see T. Buettner
et al., ‘Withholding-Tax Non-Compliance: The Case of Cum-Ex Stock-Market
Transactions’ (2018), at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960015>.
29 UK National Audit Office, op. cit., n. 25. See also Pomeranz, op. cit., n. 20; H. J.
Kleven et al., ‘Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of
Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries’ (2016) 83 Economica 219.
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Table 1. VAT evasion vs organized fraud
EVASION ORGANIZED FRAUD
Definition Results from informality
or part-time crime
Deliberate omission,
concealment, or
misrepresentation of
information to reduce
VAT liability
Coordinated and
systematic actions, with
varying levels of
sophistication and
organization, with the
aim of obtaining an
unlawful VAT financial
advantage
Type of
perpetrators
Primarily small companies Carried out largely by
organized criminal
gangs
Geographical
reach
Traditionally operating at
local, regional, or
national levels, although
spreading as a result of
the digitalization of the
economy
Primarily operating
transnationally across
borders
Method Take advantage of national
administrative
limitations and
distinctions in the tax
base
Take advantage of
enforcement limitations
by tax administrations
on cross-border trade
Type of costs Primarily tax inequity and
the creation of an
uneven playing field
Primarily revenue loss,
subsidy to organized
crime, compliance and
administrative costs
fraud, which combines evasion (under-reporting of sales) with organized fraud
(bogus traders/invoices).30
Whilst a detailed analysis of the various sub-types of VAT fraud is outside
the scope of this article,31 the most frequent types of organized fraud are
worthy of further consideration. Bogus traders, also known as ‘invoice mills’,
are companies set up solely for the purpose of selling invoices. In these
circumstances, the underlying sale of goods or services never takes place,
and the actual sale is that of the invoice giving the right to VAT refund.
The fraud therefore requires collusion between seller and purchaser, as well
as a significant level of organization. Litigation concerning bogus traders
30 K. V. Pashev, ‘Countering Cross-Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience’
(2007) 14 J. of Financial Crime 490.
31 On under-reporting software programs, known as zappers, see R. T. Ainsworth,
‘Zappers: Retail VAT Fraud’ (2010) 3 International VAT Monitor 175. On failure
to register, see B. Lockwood and L. Liu, ‘VAT Notches’ (2016) Oxford University
Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper WP 16/10.
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seems to indicate high levels of this type of fraud, primarily in Eastern
European member states.32 As regards VAT collected but not remitted to the
government, whilst there are various possible methods to commit this type of
fraud – such as false accounting, engineering bankruptcy, and VAT number
hijacking – the most important is undoubtedly missing-trader fraud (MTF).
MTF exploits two key features of the VAT system: (1) the time lag between
the collection of the tax and its remittance; and (2) the principle that requires
all exports to be VAT-free, with tax collected solely on imports. In its simplest
form, a trader – the missing trader in the MTF – collects VAT paid to
him/her by a supplier without accounting or remitting to the tax authorities
and disappears before the authorities realize what has occurred.33 There
are numerous variations of this basic model: the same goods may move
around different chains, with all of the traders in the chain involved, or aware
that the fraud is occurring (carousel fraud); or different goods may be sold
to unsuspecting third parties by fraudsters, who thereby insert themselves
into legitimate production chains (MTF). Whilst these fraud schemes have
traditionally operated within the EU, similar schemes have now developed
involving non-EU countries.34
Whilst its manifestations differ, as the analysis below will demonstrate,35
the shift in anti-fraud policy, where the focus has been exclusively on revenue
loss and revenue maximization, can be witnessed across the fraud spectrum,
encompassing both measures reportedly aimed at combating evasion and
those aimed at tackling organized fraud.
2. The costs of tax fraud
Measuring the costs of fraud, like measuring its level, is inherently difficult.36
As such, revenue losses are generally used as the basis by which to estimate
the level of fraud.37 Insofar as VAT is concerned, since 2004, it has often been
asserted that fraud accounts for approximately 10 per cent of VAT revenue
within the EU;38 more recently, however, the VAT gap within the EU has been
estimated to be €150 billion, or 12.8 per cent of the revenue collected, but
32 Case C-527/11 Ablessio ECLI:EU:C:2013:168 (Latvia); Case C-107/13 FIRIN
ECLI:EU:C:2014:151 (Bulgaria).
33 Case C-354/03 Optigen and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2005:89, para. 8.
34 F. Borselli, ‘Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in the European Union’ (2008)
5 International VAT Monitor 333.
35 See Section III below.
36 Levi and Burrows, op. cit., n. 23.
37 L. Barbone et al., The Costs of VAT: A Review of the Literature, CASE Network No.
106/2012, at 46 et seq; C. W. Nam et al., ‘Measurement of Value Added Tax Evasion
in Selected EU Countries on the Basis of National Accounts Data’ (2001) CESifo
Working Paper 431.
38 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the Use of Administrative Cooperation Arrangements in the Fight
against VAT Fraud (2004) COM(2004) 260 final, at 5.
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no precise figures for fraud are available.39 Similarly in the UK, whilst HM
Revenue & Customs (HMRC) has estimated the VAT gap to be 9.8 per cent
of total revenue for 2015–2016, no estimates have been offered for overall
VAT fraud, although some types of fraud have been quantified.40 Europol has
also offered estimates for MTF, reporting that EU countries lose €100 billion
annually to that one type of fraud – a perhaps suspiciously neat rounded
figure.41 Whilst the above are, of course, mere estimates – methodological
difficulties in establishing precise figures are openly acknowledged by tax
administrations42 – it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the share
of revenue lost within the EU to VAT fraud is considerable. This is also
supported by evidence of the increased scale of fraud, with some individual
instances of fraud so massive as to account in isolation for a significant
amount of revenue loss.43
These estimates also highlight the extent to which measuring VAT fraud
has been equated with measuring the revenue costs of VAT fraud. Whilst
this seems an instinctively reasonable approach, given the difficulties in
measuring fraud directly, it also gives rise to the common misconception
that the only costs of VAT fraud are revenue costs. Despite some institutions,
such as the European Commission or the IMF, occasionally acknowledging
the existence of other costs beyond lost revenue,44 and similarly some tax
authorities,45 it is clear that the focus in reports concerning VAT fraud is
39 European Commission, Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member
States: 2017 Final Report (2017) TAXUD/2015/CC/131, at <https://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/study_and_reports_on_the_vat_gap_2017.
pdf>.
40 HMRC, op. cit., n. 4.
41 Europol, EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2013).
42 European Court of Auditors, Tackling Intra-Community VAT Fraud: More Action
Needed (2015) Special Report No. 24, at <https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/
ECADocuments/SR15_24/SR_VAT_FRAUD_EN.pdf>.
43 One of the most infamous cases was the CO2 fraud in 2008/2009; see Europol,Carbon
Credit Fraud Causes More than 5 Billion Euros Damage for European Taxpayer, 9
December 2009, at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/carbon-credit-
fraud-causes-more-5-billion-euros-damage-for-european-taxpayer>. See also P.
Efstratios, ‘Halting the Horses: EU Policy on the VAT Carousel Fraud in the EU
Emissions Trading System’ (2012) 1 EC Tax Rev. 39; R. A. Wolf, ‘A Sad History
of Carbon Carousels’ (2010) 21 International VAT Monitor 403. On other reported
instances of massive fraud, see Eurojust, EU-Wide Fuel Oil and Precious Metals VAT
Fraud and Money Laundering Network Dismantled, 21 December 2016, at <http:
//www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2016/2016-12-21.aspx>;
Europol, Eight Member States Take Action against International VAT Fraud, 29 June
2016, at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/eight-members-states-
take-action-against-international-vat-fraud>; J. Oliver, ‘Scams Steal £8.4bn from
Taxpayer’, BBC One Panorama (2006).
44 European Commission, op. cit., n. 39, at 5; IMF, op. cit., n. 1, at 7.
45 HMRevenue & Customs, Levelling the Tax Playing Field (2013) compliance progress
report, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/levelling-the-tax-playing-
field>; Canada Revenue Agency, Tax Gap in Canada: A Conceptual Study (2016),
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Figure 2. The costs of tax fraud
largely on revenue loss. However, as with other types of fraud, revenue
loss – or transfer costs – is just one of the problems associated with VAT
fraud. Generally, fraud costs can be disaggregated into various components:
costs of preventing fraud (anticipatory costs), costs of responding to fraud,
and negative externalities.46 All are evident in VAT fraud, and in tax fraud
more broadly. Apart from revenue loss, and as demonstrated in Figure 2,
tax fraud gives rise to significant compliance and administrative costs for
both tax administrations and businesses, and to significant negative spillovers:
distortions to competition, tax inequity, and subsidies to organized crime.
Some of these are new resource costs, rather than transfer costs, which have
detrimental effects on economic welfare.47
Tax fraud can impose significant costs upon legitimate traders by creating
distortions to competition. A lobby group set up by UK-based small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been drawing attention to the distortive
problems caused by alleged VAT fraud perpetrated online by non-EU
traders,48 and research increasingly substantiates these anecdotal reports.
Economic models indicate that tax-evading firms are likely to drive non-
at <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/corporate/about-canada-revenue-
agency-cra/tax-canada-a-conceptual-study>.
46 Levi and Burrows, op. cit., n. 23.
47 M. Feldstein, ‘Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of Income’ (1999) 81 Rev. of
Economics and Statistics 674; R. Chetty, ‘Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient
to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance’ (2009) 1
Am. Economic Rev.: Economic Policy 31.
48 Campaign against VAT Fraud on eBay & Amazon in the UK, at <http://www.
vatfraud.org>.
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evading ones out of the market;49 and although there are few empirical
studies, those that do exist confirm that this impact can be highly significant
for affected industries.50 The impact is also likely to affect SMEs more
severely than bigger firms, as the latter’s cash-flow levels allow them to
better respond to these distortive effects. Finally, there is also evidence that
fraud results in less frequent and lower-quality trade in affected industries,
as non-evading firms refrain from engaging in trade or divert trade where
they suspect that businesses are involved in tax fraud. Once again, research
into these ‘hidden costs’ of fraud seems to confirm anecdotal reports
suggesting that bigger businesses are now wary of trading with SMEs for
fear of becoming inadvertently involved in VAT fraud and the resulting costs
associated with it.51
Directly connected with the distortive costs of tax fraud are its effects
on tax equity.52 Tax equity is one of the key taxation principles, and it is
usually divided into horizontal equity, according to which taxpayers in similar
circumstances should be subject to similar tax burdens, and vertical equity,
which broadly requires that those with higher incomes carry a higher tax
burden than those with lower incomes.53 Tax fraud tends to undermine vertical
equity and thus results in a more regressive tax system,54 because in the
absence of a counteracting effect of tax morality,55 those with higher incomes
are more likely to be able to engage in fraud.56 Whilst there is an ongoing
debate on the role of vertical tax equity within consumption taxes,57 tax equity
in its horizontal dimension is a key principle of VAT, as it is of any tax.58
Violations of horizontal tax equity are therefore regarded as serious flaws
in any tax arrangement.59 Tax fraud, by definition, introduces an element of
horizontal tax inequity into the tax system, insofar as it results in similarly
situated taxpayers facing dissimilar tax burdens.
49 J. Strand, ‘Tax Distortions, Household Production, and Black-Market Work’ (2005)
21 European J. of Political Economy 851.
50 M. C. Frunza et al., ‘Missing Trader Fraud on the Emissions Market’ (2011) 18 J. of
Financial Crime 183.
51 L. Boulafoutas et al., ‘The Hidden Costs of Tax Evasion: Collaborative Tax Evasion
in the Markets for Expert Services’ (2015) 129 J. of Public Economics 14.
52 This has been termed ‘social fairness’ by criminologists; see Levi, op. cit., n. 27.
53 D. Elkins, ‘Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory’ (2006) 24 Yale Law and
Policy Rev. 43.
54 J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki, ‘Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration’ in
Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3, eds. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (2002)
1423.
55 K. Lee, ‘Morality, Tax Evasion and Equity’ (2016) 82 Mathematical Social Sciences
97.
56 Alstadserter et al., op. cit., n. 8.
57 de la Feria, op. cit., n. 11.
58 However, this is not universally accepted; see L. Kaplow, ‘Horizontal Equity: New
Measures, Unclear Principles’ (2000) NBER Working Paper 7649.
59 Elkins, op. cit., n. 53, at 44. For a different conception of the term, see L. Murphy and
T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (2002).
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Any tax break – either by design, as a result of tax policy, or by accident,
as a result of tax fraud – is in essence a redistribution from those who do
not get it to those who do.60 In the case of consumption taxes such as VAT,
how that impact is felt and by whom depends on the type and circumstances
of the fraud. Assuming that the incidence of these taxes falls on consumers
as taxpayers,61 inequity can arise amongst consumers; where fraudulent
businesses charge less tax, and thus a lower price, than non-fraudulent ones
in order to obtain a competitive advantage, inequity may also arise; where tax
is charged to consumers equally by all businesses, but fraudulent ones fail
to remit it to tax administrations, the latter also obtain a financial advantage.
In between these key alternatives, there are many hybrid situations where tax
inequity arises amongst both consumers and businesses – for example, where
fraudulent businesses charge only part of the tax due to consumers, but fail to
remit any to tax authorities.
That VAT fraud creates horizontal tax inequity is not only relevant per
se but also because there is strong evidence that perceptions of tax equity
impact upon compliance levels.62 In particular, tax inequity undermines what
has been referred to as tax morale: taxpayers’ self-regulatory mechanism that
cognitively frames paying taxes as doing ‘the right thing’.63 Where there is
perceived tax inequity, taxpayers are less likely to think morally, and more
likely to respond to taxation through defiance,64 as the sense of the fairness
of the tax system is important for general tax compliance.65 Conversely,
economic evidence indicates that non-evading taxpayers derive direct utility
from tax enforcement on evaders, regardless of any monetary returns,66 as
confirmed by recent behavioural science experiments.67
Whilst the links between tax fraud generally and other criminal activities,
such as money laundering, have long been suspected,68 the links specifically
60 Murphy and Nagel, id., at 164.
61 This will depend on market circumstances; see de la Feria, op. cit., n. 11.
62 J. Slemrod, ‘Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion’ (2007) 21 J. of
Economic Perspectives 25, at 38 et seq; D. Onu and L. Oats, ‘The Role of Social
Norms in Tax Compliance: Theoretical Overview and Practical Implications’ (2015)
1 J. of Tax Administration 113.
63 V. Braithwaite, Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing
Authority in a Democracy (2009), at 148–158.
64 V. Braithwaite, ‘Tax Evasion’ in Handbook on Crime and Public Policy, ed. M. Tonry
(2009) 381, at 384; L. Casaburi and U. Troiano, ‘Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral
Response to a Large Anti-Evasion Program’ (2016) 131 Q. J. of Economics 273, at
309.
65 H. Filipczyk, Tax Avoidance and Rationality of Law (2017), at 357–358.
66 Casaburi and Troiano, op. cit., n. 64, at 9.
67 D. Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference
(2015), at 112–115; M. Hallsworth et al., ‘The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using
Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance’ (2017) 148 J. of Public
Economics 14.
68 M. Levi, ‘Money for Crime andMoney from Crime: Financing Crime and Laundering
Crime Proceeds’ (2015) 21 European J. of Criminal Policy Research 275.
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between VAT fraud and organized crime were less well known,69 despite
the fact that the risk of organized fraud, particularly through the use of
fake invoices or supplies, is inherent to VAT systems.70 This connection,
and the use of tax fraud as a method of financing illegal activities, has
now been acknowledged by EU institutions71 and is a common feature of
media reports.72 Whilst there are reports of various types of VAT fraud
perpetrated by organized crime networks,73 MTF seems to be a particularly
attractive source of financing for organized crime and paramilitary groups.
Although official acknowledgement of such links is recent, their existence has
been described in criminological research since the early 1990s.74 Previous
experience in the Benelux countries had already indicated that the VAT system
was vulnerable to organized fraud;75 and in the late 1980s and early 1990s
research alerted the European Commission to the possibility that intra-EU
VAT fraud was about to establish itself in the form of crime networks.76
According to field experts, the feared flow of mega-frauds did not emerge
immediately; instead, criminal activity is said to have started over a two-
year period. At first, so-called veterans tested the system and how easy it
was to commit VAT fraud; they were then followed by some ‘legitimate’
69 M. Levi, ‘Organized Fraud and Organizing Frauds: Unpacking Research on Networks
and Organization’ (2008) 8 Criminology and Criminal Justice 389.
70 Keen and Smith, op. cit., n. 21, at 867–868. See also A. Tait, Value-Added Tax:
International Practice and Problems (1988), at 307.
71 European Court of Auditors, op. cit., n. 42; Europol, op. cit., n. 41; Europol,
op. cit., n. 43. See also HM Government, Serious and Organised Crime Strategy
(2013), at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-organised-crime-
strategy>; Center for the Study of Democracy, Financing of Organised Crime (2015),
at 61 et seq.
72 S. O’Driscoll, ‘Man Who Paid Dissident’s Bail Ran Northern Ireland’s Biggest Ever
Money-Laundering Scam’ Belfast Telegraph, 28 April 2017, at <https://www.belfast
telegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/man-who-paid-dissidents-bail-ran-northern-
irelands-biggest-ever-money-laundering-scam-35661638.html>; A. Travis and A.
Seager, ‘Reid Wants Europe to Fight VAT Fraud Linked to Terror Funds’ Guardian,
26 October 2006, at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/oct/26/eu.
terrorism>.
73 A. Berwick and D. Lague, ‘Special Report: The Immigrant Success Story that
Led Spanish Police to a Chinese Banking Behemoth’ Reuters, 1 August 2017,
at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icbc-chinese-specialreport/the-immigrant-
success-story-that-led-spanish-police-to-a-chinese-banking-behemoth-idUSKBN
1AH40G>.
74 P. van Duyne, ‘VAT Fraud and the Policy of Global Ignorance’ (1999) 1 European J.
of Law Reform 425; S. White, ‘VAT Revenue and Organised Crime: Time for Action?’
(1999) 24 European Law Rev. 433.
75 Y. Fedchyshyn, ‘Postponed Accounting in the European Union’ (2014) 1 International
VAT Monitor 11; C. Amand and K. Boucquez, ‘A New Defense for Victims of EU
Missing-Trader Fraud?’ (2011) 4 International VAT Monitor 234, at 236.
76 van Duyne, op. cit., n. 74, at 434.
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traders;77 and finally the ‘legitimate’ and ‘criminal’ entrepreneurs started to
cooperate.78
Compliance and administrative costs are second-order costs, resulting
not from fraud itself but from its spread. For non-fraudulent businesses
and for tax administrations, there are two main types of costs: (1)
anticipatory costs, where those entities take measures to prevent involvement
in fraud (businesses) or to deter fraud (tax administrations), such as the
implementation of new software or due diligence; and (2) reactive costs,
where fraud has taken place, and costs arise in the context of inadvertently
engaging with fraudsters (businesses) or pursuing civil or criminal actions
against fraudsters (tax administrations).79 There is evidence that evasion in
particular also gives rise to resource costs for fraudsters, as they try to
conceal the fraud,80 or, in the case of risk-averse fraudsters, as a result of
the uncertainty created by engaging in fraud.81
Although the above costs of tax fraud are significant, and often nominally
recognized, the analysis below demonstrates that they seem to have been
largely ignored in the context of anti-fraud policy, where the focus has
been exclusively on revenue loss, with significant consequences for tax
enforcement. This is the case both where policies are primarily aimed at
tackling evasion (penalties and legal formalism) and where they are primarily
aimed at tackling organized fraud (third-party liability principle).
III. TACKLING TAX FRAUD
The approach to tackling tax fraud has traditionally been relatively
unsophisticated, relying primarily on penalties and other administrative and
criminal sanctions. Despite attracting significant academic attention,82 there
has been a sense that, from a tax administration perspective, primarily in
developed countries,83 further investment in tackling fraud may have been
perceived as inefficient, as the difficulties and human resources costs involved
77 P. C. van Duyne, ‘Organized Crime, Corruption and Power’ (1997) 26 Crime, Law
and Social Change 201.
78 On the parasitic relationship between legitimate and organized crime traders, see A.
Aronowitz et al., Value-Added Tax Fraud in the European Union (1996).
79 Levi and Burrows, op. cit., n. 23.
80 R. C. Bayer, ‘A Contest with the Taxman: The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion
and Wastefully Invested Resources’ (2006) 50 European Economic Rev. 1071.
81 S. Yitzhaki, ‘A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs’ (1979) 69 Am.
Economic Rev. 475.
82 M. G. Allingham and S. Sandmo, ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’
(1972) 1 J. of Public Economics 323.
83 In developing countries, attention has tended to be greater; see R. de la Feria and
A. Schoeman, ‘Addressing VAT Fraud in Developing Countries: The Tax Policy–
Administration Symbiosis’ (2019) 47 Intertax 950.
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in adopting a stricter approach outweighed the potential revenue benefits.84
The last decade, however, has seen a massive shift in this approach, with
increased attention being paid to anti-fraud policy. Whilst there are various
factors at play,85 this shift has undoubtedly been due in part to better
understanding of how to combat fraud, and the availability of new tools
to do so, in particular promising developments in behavioural science –
from responsive regulation86 to nudge theories87 – as well as the use of
new technologies,88 all of which allow a stricter approach to enforcement
at a lower cost than traditional methods. Although these are clearly positive
developments, the wider picture on anti-fraud policy is not as inspiring.
1. Penalties and legal formalism
Whilst behavioural science has provided new insights into tax compliance
and the reasons behind tax evasion,89 the traditional view stems largely
from economics-of-crime theories according to which taxpayers weigh the
expected benefits of tax fraud with the uncertain prospect of detention and
punishment.90 According to this view, audits, penalties, and other negative
compliance incentives were not just effective anti-evasion methods, they were
the onlymethods.91 Following this traditional approach, all EU member states
have been applying penalties and other negative compliance incentives for
a long time, with the majority dividing these into two categories: (1) civil
penalties applied to minor compliance offences, and (2) criminal penalties
applied to tax evasion actions.92 The last decade, however, has seen in many
EU member states a marked toughening of the penalties regime.
As is also evident in recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
case law, this toughening has been reflected not only in the number of
84 A. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance (1996)
Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service Publication 1916, at 40. See
Section IV below on the cost–benefit analysis undertaken by tax administrations.
85 See Section IV below.
86 J. Freedman, ‘Responsive Regulation, Risk, and the Rules: Applying the Theory to
Tax Practice’ (2012) 44 University of British Columbia Law Rev. 627; I. Ayres and J.
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the De-Regulation Debate (1992).
87 Halpern, op. cit., n. 67.
88 OECD, Technologies for Better Tax Administration: A Practical Guide for Revenue
Bodies (2016); OECD, Technology Tools to Tackle Tax Evasion and Tax Fraud (2017);
R. Bird and E. Zolt, ‘Technology and Taxation in Developing Countries: From Hand
to Mouse’ (2008) 61 National Tax J. 791.
89 J. Slemrod, ‘Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and Its Policy
Implications’ (2016) Ross School of Business Paper 1302.
90 J. Alm et al., ‘Why Do People Pay Taxes?’ (1992) 48 J. of Public Economics 21, at
21–22.
91 Allingham and Sandmo, op. cit., n. 82; J. Dubin and L. Wilde, ‘An Empirical Analysis
of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance’ (1988) 41 National Tax J. 61.
92 R. Seer and A. L. Wilms (eds), Surcharges and Penalties in Tax Law (2016) EATLP
International Tax Series, Vol. 14 Chapters 12–31.
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penalties issued and the level of penalties charged but also in the diversity
of penalties, which now include in some EU member states not only financial
charges but also the removal of tax rights.93 Whilst penalty regimes are not
harmonized at the EU level, and member states are therefore free to choose
the penalties that seem most appropriate, the CJEU has consistently reiterated
that this power must nevertheless be exercised in accordance with general
principles of EU law, and in particular the principle of proportionality,94 as is
also now enshrined in Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In
order to comply with this principle, penalties must therefore be suitable (they
are appropriate to attain the stated aim) and necessary (they do not go beyond
what is necessary to attain that aim). The aim against which proportionality
is to be assessed is the dual function of penalties: a punitive function and
a deterrence function.95 Proportionate penalties are therefore those that are
appropriate to punish and deter non-tax compliance, and that do not go beyond
what is necessary to act as a punishment or a deterrent.96
When evaluating whether the principle of proportionality has been
respected, the Court tends to concentrate on the second element of the
proportionality test – namely, whether the penalties in question go beyond
what is necessary to deter fraud. In this regard, member states must consider
inter alia the nature and the seriousness of the breach, and the scale of the
penalty,97 the correlation between the breach and the penalty imposed,98 and
whether there was actual revenue loss.99 For example, Latvian penalties for
failure to register, which are aimed at recovering the estimated amount of
tax that would have been due had registration taken place,100 and Hungarian
penalties charged where no loss of revenue has occurred and there is no
evidence of evasion,101 or where the error has been rectified,102 have been
deemed disproportionate by the Court.103
The Court has rarely made reference to the suitability of penalties, the
first element of the proportionality test. Rather, their suitability seems to be
assumed, based on the traditional understanding as regards the effectiveness
of penalties, and the sense that the higher the penalty, the stronger the
93 Case C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458.
94 Case C-210/94, Siesse, ECLI:EU:C:1995:351, at para. 21.
95 On the applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), see G. Marino, ‘Limitation of Administrative Penalties by the European
Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in Seer
and Wilms (eds), op. cit., n. 92, 133.
96 Case C-183/14, Salomie and Oltean, ECLI:EU:C:2015:454, at para. 51.
97 Case C-259/12, RODOPI-M 91, ECLI:EU:C:2013:414, at para. 38.
98 Case C-263/11, Re¯dlihs, ECLI: EU:C:2012:497, at paras 49–50.
99 Case C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458, at paras 73–74.
100 Case C-263/11, Re¯dlihs, ECLI: EU:C:2012:497.
101 Case C-564/15, Farkas, ECLI:EU:C:2017:302.
102 Case C-368/09, Pannon Gép Centrum, ECLI:EU:C:2010:441.
103 National courts have also reacted against the new approach to penalties; see Mark
Richard Beardwood v. HMRC [2018] UKFTT 99 (TC).
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deterrence.104 Yet there is now strong empirical evidence that indicates
that such effectiveness is far from guaranteed. Even disregarding recent
developments in behavioural economics, empirical research suggests that the
risk of audit is a much stronger incentive to compliance than penalties,105
as are in-person visits, due to their network effects,106 and well-designed,
targeted letters.107 Contrary to the traditional economic deterrence theory,108
recent evidence indicates that the risk of penalty can be effective on late
compliers, but not on non-compliers.109
Often unnecessarily burdensome, and with questions raised over its
suitability, the toughening of penalties is therefore difficult to justify in the
context of deterrence or even punishment of tax fraud. Yet its potential
for additional revenue collection is clear; audits may be a better deterrent,
but they carry significantly more administrative costs and are therefore less
efficient.110 Similar conclusions can be drawn as regards the recent tendency
to engage in legal formalism, in the context of tax compliance obligations.
Although used in different contexts, legal formalism reflects a positivist
theory of law.111 In tax law, legal formalism is often discussed in the context
of substantive tax rules and tax avoidance, as a formalistic approach that
facilitates the manipulation of legal rules and the granting of tax advantages
where the letter of the law is complied with, even where its purpose is not.112
The term is rarely considered, if ever, from the perspective of procedural law.
Yet, as the CJEU has demonstrated, the last decade has seen the adoption of an
increasingly formalistic interpretation of compliance rules by member states’
104 L. Lederman, ‘Tax Penalties as Instruments of Cooperative Tax Compliance Regimes’
in Seer and Wilms (eds), op. cit., n. 92, 31, at 38–39 and 43.
105 Pomeranz, op. cit., n. 20; C. Agostini et al., ‘Firms Response to Tax Enforcement
through Audits’ (2018) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working
Paper WP 18/09.
106 W. C. Boning et al., ‘Heard It through the Grapevine: Direct and Network Effects of
a Tax Enforcement Field Experiment’ (2018) NBER Working Paper 24305.
107 J. E. de Neve et al., ‘How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-
Wide Experiments in Belgium’ (2019) Said Business School Working Paper WP
2019-07. Negative results were found in earlier studies; see B. Ariel, ‘Deterrence
and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: Findings from a
Randomized Controlled Trial’ (2012) 50 Criminology 27.
108 G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 J. of Political
Economy 169. However, this theory’s limitations have been known for some time; see
M. Graetz and L. Wilde, ‘The Economics of Tax Compliance’ (1985) 38 National Tax
J. 355.
109 B. Meiselman, ‘Ghostbusting in Detroit: Evidence on Nonfilers from a Controlled
Field Experiment’ (2018) 158 J. of Public Economics 180.
110 Pomeranz, op. cit., n. 20; Plumley, op. cit., n. 84.
111 F. Schauer, ‘Formalism’ (1989) 97 Yale Law J. 509; B. Leiter, ‘Legal Formalism and
Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?’ (2010) 16 Legal Theory 111.
112 D. Weisbach, ‘Formalism in the Tax Law’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Rev.
860; D. McBarnet and C. Whelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the
Struggle for Legal Control’ (1991) 54Modern Law Rev. 848.
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tax authorities to justify the denial of tax rights where evidence of fraud is
neither apparent nor suspected.
Most of the cases decided by the CJEU in this regard have concerned
invoicing rules, whereby the right to deduct VATwas refused on the basis of an
error in the emission of an invoice: where the invoice contained inaccuracies,
even though corrected invoices or other additional information had been
subsequently submitted;113 where the invoice had been drawn before VAT
registration;114 where the invoice had been amended;115 where the invoice was
deemed to be too vague;116 and where the invoice did not include the VAT
identification number of the acquirer of the goods.117 A similar formalistic
approach to compliance rules has been reported at the national level, with
German courts notably imposing criminal penalties for failing to immediately
amend inaccurate VAT returns.118
In all of these cases, with one exception,119 the CJEU sided with the
taxpayer, expressly rejecting a formalistic interpretation of the invoicing rules
and adopting a substance-over-form approach. It has therefore consistently
stated that where substantive requirements are satisfied, rights cannot be
rejected on the basis of the failure to comply with the formal requirements.
A similar approach has also been adopted in cases concerning other
compliance rules, in particular accounting records,120 accounting of tax,121
and overpayment of tax.122 The most significant element in all of these cases
is that in none was evasion alleged, and that in all there was clear evidence
from the outset of the existence of a substantive right, despite the lack of
respect for a formal requirement. As such, and similarly to recent trends
concerning penalties, it is difficult to justify this legal formalism in respect
of compliance rules in the context of deterrence or punishment of tax fraud.
Its potential for additional revenue collection, however, is clear.
2. The development of the principle of third-party liability
Despite some recent EU-level measures,123 the feedback from EU member
states indicated that traditional EU approaches to tackling organized fraud in
113 Case C-368/09, Pannon Gep Centrum, ECLI:EU:C:2010:441.
114 Case C-385/09, Nidera, ECLI:EU:C:2010:627.
115 Case C-518/14, Senatex, ECLI:EU:C:2016:691.
116 Case C-516/14, Barlis 06, ECLI:EU:C:2016:690.
117 Case C-587/10, VSTR, ECLI:EU:C:2012:592.
118 J. Meyer-Burrow and O. Stumm, ‘Recent Developments in German Criminal Law and
Their Impact on VAT Compliance’ (2011) 3 International VAT Monitor 3.
119 Case C-271/12, Petroma Transports and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:297.
120 Case C-146/05, Collee, ECLI:EU:C:2007:549.
121 Case C-284/11, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458.
122 Case C-138/12, Rusedespred, ECLI:EU:C:2013:233.
123 See European Commission, On the Follow-Up to the Action Plan on VAT: Towards a
Single EU VAT Area – Time to Act (2017) COM(2017) 566 final.
18
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cardiff University (CU).
particular were felt to be lacking.124 From the early 2000s onwards, therefore,
a new trend started to emerge amongst EU member states, with the adoption
of new domestic legislation and administrative practices. Like measures
concerning penalties or formalistic approaches to compliance, these new
measures were purportedly aimed at strengthening anti-fraud policy in the
context of organized fraud, yet their design means that by nature they cannot
tackle fraud per se but merely minimize its revenue costs. Unsurprisingly,
these measures have given rise to unprecedented levels of litigation, with
dozens of cases reaching the CJEU. At the centre of litigation at the CJEU
level – necessarily a small fraction of total litigation within the EU125 –
have been the legislative or administrative practices of only some member
states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands,
Poland, and the UK. The suspicion, however, is that similar practices are being
adopted in many other EU member states but that litigation is not reaching the
CJEU;126 equally, there is evidence of similar practices being adopted in other
countries outside the EU.127
What makes these cases so remarkable is the fact that, in all but a few,
the taxpayers involved in the litigation were not those allegedly committing
the fraud, but a third party with some business connection to the presumed
fraudster. This third party could be the seller of the goods to the alleged
fraudster, the purchaser of those goods, an intermediary, or even a warehouse
keeper. The phenomenon whereby private parties not forming part of the
criminal justice system are legally or administratively held responsible
for crime prevention has been termed responsibilization, and is neither
exclusive to VAT fraud nor new. As discussed below, this phenomenon has
been identified as part of a general trend within crime control during the
late twentieth century,128 which has spread in particular within criminal
124 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the Application of Council Regulation (EU) No. 904/2010 Concerning
Administrative Cooperation and Combating Fraud in the Field of Value Added Tax
(2014) COM(2014) 71 final. See also S. Fedeli and F. Forte, ‘EU VAT Frauds’ (2011)
31 European J. of Law and Economics 143, at 162–163.
125 In the UK, the number of cases decided by domestic courts largely exceeded those
that reached the CJEU. See M. Schofield, ‘S&I Electronics Plc v HMRC and the State
of MTIC VAT Fraud’ (2015) 5 Brit. Tax Rev. 663; K. Rahman and I. Roxan, ‘Mobilx
Ltd (in Administration) and others v. HMRC: Is This the End of Fraudulent Evasion
of VAT?’ (2010) 5 Brit. Tax Rev. 492.
126 On Italian practices, see M. Bancalari and F. T. Coaloa, ‘The Unlawful Consequences
of Italy’s Registration Procedure’ (2013) 3 International VAT Monitor 158. On
Swedish practices, see E. Kristoffersson, ‘Tax Fraud, Tax Abuse and the Right to
Deduct Input VAT in Sweden’ (2013) 2World J. of VAT/GST Law 261.
127 On Canadian practices, see M. C. Marcil, ‘The Recipient’s Knowledge of Fraud and
Its Impact on the Recovery of Refunds and Credits’ (2013) 2 World J. of VAT/GST
Law 214.
128 D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society
(2002).
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justice responses to financial crimes, such as money laundering.129 Why the
phenomenon spread to VAT fraud and how it developed therein can be better
understood by analysing the evolution of the CJEU case law on organized VAT
fraud.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that the responsibilization phenomenon
was first identified in the Anglo-American context, the process of
responsibilization of third parties for VAT fraud seems to have started – at
least within the EU – in the UK. In 2002, HMRC started refusing VAT
refunds to traders where the purchaser of those goods had turned out to
be a (missing trader) fraudster. The general view then was that this new
approach was financially motivated and linked to the difficulty in catching
fraudsters and the near-impossible task of recovering the revenue lost to
fraud.130 Unsurprisingly, the new practice led to immediate litigation. Three
cases, Optigen, Fulcrum, and Bond House, were soon lodged before the UK
courts, and later referred to the CJEU.131 The resulting judgement became the
first in a series of decisions that ultimately led to the establishment of the
principle of third-party liability for VAT fraud.132
In that decision, the Court rejected third-party liability, concluding that,
insofar as the taxable party had no knowledge and no means of knowledge of
the fraud, it should be allowed to deduct input VAT, regardless of the existence
of prior or subsequent fraudulent VAT transactions in the supply chain.133
This initial rejection was, however, soon significantly qualified in Kittel and
Recolta Recycling, with the introduction of the concept of innocence:134 third-
party liability for VAT fraud was possible where ‘the recipient taxpayer knew,
or should have known, that the goods were connected with the fraudulent
evasion of VAT’.135 Whilst ascertaining knowledge of fraud is a matter of
proof, the phrase ‘should have known’ raised immediate concerns as to its
129 E. Baker, ‘The Legal Regulation of Transnational Organised Crime: Opportunities
and Limitations’ in Transnational Organised Crime, eds A. Edwards and P. Gill
(2003) 183.
130 R. Pincher, ‘The Costs of VAT Frauds: Bond House Systems Ltd and Optigen’ (2003)
5 Brit. Tax Rev. 346.
131 G. Richards, ‘Carousel Fraud: Absolving the Innocent: Optigen Ltd and Others v
Commissioners of Customs & Excise’ (2006) 2 Brit. Tax Rev. 147.
132 For a comprehensive analysis of the jurisprudential development of the principle, see
R. de la Feria and R. Foy, ‘Italmoda: The Birth of the Principle of Third-Party Liability
for VAT Fraud’ (2016) 4 Brit. Tax Rev. 262.
133 Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03, and C-484/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:16. See also
S. Vandenberghe and H. J. Sharkett, ‘Rights of Taxable Persons Involved in VAT
Carousel Fraud from an EU, Belgian and UK Point of View Today and Tomorrow’
(2006) 17 International VAT Monitor 254.
134 Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:446. See also I. Lejeune
et al., ‘Limited Third-Party Liability in the EU VAT Matters’ (2012) 6 International
VAT Monitor 397.
135 Joined Cases, id., at para. 14.
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meaning and scope.136 From that point forth, the CJEU case law on third-party
liability for VAT fraud was divided into two streams: (1) cases concerning the
burden of proof for establishing liability,137 and (2) cases concerning the scope
of that liability.
In terms of the scope of liability, the first question then was whether third-
party liability for fraud could be extended to the removal of other rights, in
particular the right to VAT exemption on intra-EU sales, if the acquirer of
those products turned out to be a fraudster. Although the CJEU implicitly
accepted the potential denial of those rights earlier,138 express confirmation
only came in the Mecsek-Gabona case.139 Whilst at the time this extension
may have appeared to be a small legal step, in reality it was an extremely
significant one. Indeed, there are fundamental differences between making a
business that acquired products from a fraudster liable, by denying the right
to deduct input VAT, and making a business that supplied goods to a potential
fraudster liable, by denying the right to VAT exemption. Both instances
constitute third-party liability for unknowing participation in organized VAT
fraud, in the form of denial of rights. Yet denying deductibility to the acquirer
of goods constitutes the imposition of liability for a crime that has already
occurred and has been committed in the same country that is now imposing
the liability; by contrast, denying the right to VAT exemption on intra-EU
sales to the supplier of goods amounts to the imposition of liability for a crime
that has not yet occurred and that will be committed extraterritorially.140 The
responsibilization for a crime that has not yet occurred is not unique to VAT
fraud and can been seen as part of a wider shift to a pre-crime society, where
crime is conceived essentially as risk or potential loss, and practices are pre-
emptive as opposed to post hoc.141 Insofar as the extraterritoriality element
is concerned, the extension of the scope of third-party liability creates the
opportunity for the imposition of double liability for a single crime, yielding
double the revenue than what has been lost to the actual fraud: where both the
136 Similar wording is often used in the context of money laundering and income tax
evasion; see Alldridge, op. cit., n. 19, at 170–174.
137 Cases C-384/04, Federation of Technological Industries and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2006:309; C-409/04, Teleos plc and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:548;
C-277/14, PPUH Stehcemp, ECLI:EU:C:2015:719. See also Y. Serandour,
‘Establishing VAT Fraud in the Case of Cross-Border Supply’ (2012) 1 World
J. of VAT/GST Law 95.
138 Case C-409/04, Teleos plc and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:548. See also S. Nathoeni
and W. de Wit, ‘VAT Exemptions of Intra-Community Supplies of Goods: State of
Play after VSTR’ (2013) 2 EC Tax Rev. 100.
139 Case C-273/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:547. See also R. Wolf, ‘Mecsek-Gabona: The Final
Step of the ECJ’s Doctrine on Reliance on EU Law for Abusive or Fraudulent Ends
in the Context of Intra-Community Transactions’ (2013) 5 International VAT Monitor
280.
140 M. Sutich and P. Centore, ‘Denial of a Right and Extraterritoriality: Strengthening the
Fight against Tax Fraud’ (2015) 4World J. of VAT/GST Law 101.
141 L. Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’ (2007) 11 Theoretical Criminology
261.
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supplier (A) and the acquirer (C) are made liable for fraud committed by a
fraudster (B). Cases of the imposition of double liability for one instance of
organized VAT fraud have already been reported – a de facto economic double
taxation through enforcement.142
As significant as this extension has been, it has still only concerned the
removal of rights. The most recent debate regarding the scope of the third-
party liability has been whether it extends beyond organized VAT fraud
to all VAT fraud, and from the possible removal of rights to include the
imposition of obligations. The answer finally came in the Court’s landmark
decision in Italmoda,143 in which it established that the liability for VAT
fraud can arise in the absence of national legislation providing for it,144 which
in essence transformed third-party liability for VAT fraud from a rule into
a principle. This has significant theoretical and practical implications: the
scope of the new principle of third-party liability for tax fraud, as developed
by the Court, appears to apply to any type of fraud and to extend to the
potential creation of VAT obligations to any party within the production chain,
including intermediaries such as warehouse owners or online retail platforms;
and it is now implicitly endorsed in new EU provisions, which determine that
online retail platforms will be held liable for unpaid import VAT.145
3. Third-party liability as aggravated responsibilization
The phenomenon of responsibilization emerged as a new mode of governing
crime in the late twentieth century.146 Prompted by a series of transformations
in perceptions of crime and criminal justice structures, and the policy
decision that the state could no longer assume sole responsibility for crime
control,147 governments sought to devolve responsibility for crime prevention
to organizations and individuals outside the state. Once the new strategy
was established, it became a case of identifying those private organizations
and individuals who should have the responsibility for reducing crime
opportunities effectively. Responsibilization of the private sector with regards
to fraud and money laundering became commonplace,148 with financial
142 M. Malecka, ‘Not Your Business but Your Liability: New VAT Third-Party Liability
in Poland’ (2013) 2World J. of VAT/GST Law 253.
143 Joined Cases C-131/13, C-163/13, and C-164/13, EU:C:2014:2455.
144 Concerns have been already raised; see J. Sanders, ‘The ECJ Decision in Italmoda in
the Light of the Settled Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 6
International VAT Monitor 421.
145 Council Directive 2017/2455/EU [2017] OJ L 348/7.
146 D. Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in the
Contemporary Society’ (1996) 36 Brit. J. of Criminology 445.
147 Id., at 448. See also S. Schneider, ‘Privatising Economic Crime Enforcement:
Explaining the Role of Private Sector Investigative Agencies in Combating Money
Laundering’ (2006) 16 Policing and Society 285.
148 Levi and Burrows, op. cit., n. 23.
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institutions bearing the brunt of the responsibility.149 Responsibilization then
spread to other areas, such as cybercrime, with the telecommunications and
financial industries acquiring key roles in crime control.150
The extension of responsibilization to tax fraud was progressive, with
some instances dating back many years151 and empirical evidence strongly
indicating that third-party information reporting played an important role
in tax compliance.152 However, the development of the principle of third-
party liability marks a new stage in both the acknowledgement153 and the
scope of the responsibilization of the private sector for tax enforcement.154
This responsibilization, under the principle of third-party liability, has one
key difference from other instances of responsibilization: as in other areas, it
privatizes crime control, but by contrast, it also privatizes (some of) the costs
of crime. Under the principle of third-party liability, businesses are required to
carry out due diligence to ensure that their business partners are not involved
in fraud – and, as such, carry responsibility for crime control.155 Where the
tax authorities present objective evidence that businesses should have known
that fraud was being committed, those businesses lose the right to exercise
their rights to a tax refund or tax exemption, and may be held liable for the tax
that went unpaid; in this case, therefore, they carry the responsibility for the
revenue costs of the fraud, which are transferred to them through the denial
of tax rights or the imposition of new tax obligations. This transfer has a
detrimental impact upon businesses which, whilst uncommon in the context of
responsibilization, is quite common within criminal justice systems through
asset confiscation regimes.
Asset confiscation regimes have existed in several countries for many years,
but the same transformations that led to the development of responsibilization
in the late twentieth century also led to a renewed emphasis on these regimes
149 Council Directive 2015/849/EU [2015] OJ L 141/73. See also V. Mitsilegas and
N. Vavoula, ‘The Evolving EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Challenges for
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 23 Maastricht J. of European and
Comparative Law 261.
150 K. Uchimira, ‘Third-Party Responsibilisation through Telecoms Policing’ in Cyber-
Crime: The Challenge in Asia, eds R. Broadhurst and P. Grabosky (2005) 109.
151 A. Desai, ‘What a History of Tax Withholding Tells Us about the Relationship
between Statutes and Constitutional Law’ (2014) 108 Northwestern University Law
Rev. 859.
152 L. Lederman, ‘Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Rev. 695; Pomeranz, op. cit., n. 20.
153 M. Griffioen and L. van der Het van Dijk, ‘New European Approach to Combat VAT
Fraud’ (2014) 42 Intertax 298.
154 The principle is spreading to other taxes; see R. Seer and A. L. Wilms, ‘General
Report’ in Seer and Wilms (eds), op. cit., n. 92, 3, at 26.
155 B. Gunacker-Slawitsch, ‘The Knowing Participation in VAT Fraud: Reflections on the
Contents and the Limits of a Reasonable Duty of Due Diligence’ (2017) 5 Brit. Tax
Rev. 649.
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as part of a trend towards a ‘follow-the-money approach’ in crime control.156
These new confiscation regimes allow various types of confiscation,
including non-conviction-based confiscation, in which the confiscation of
assets is pursued under civil proceedings, detached from criminal proceedings
and regardless of their existence. This type of confiscation is usually justified
on the basis of one or more of the following elements: (1) deterrence, by
preventing the use of the proceeds of crime;157 (2) prevention, by hindering
re-investment; (3) restoration of the status quo that would have existed
if crime had not been committed; and (4) remedy, by compensating the
victims of crime conduct, or the state for costs related to law enforcement.
Underlying these justifications are two key considerations: (1) efficiency, as
the potentially higher costs and risks of criminal proceedings are avoided;158
and (2) a moral imperative, rather than a rational one, according to
which no one should benefit from their crimes.159 Both the justifications
and the underlying considerations assume that non-conviction-based asset
confiscation targets criminal proceeds, thereby tackling crime in rem and
ensuring a restitutionary effect.
Yet, insofar as the principle of third-party liability is concerned, it is not
the proceeds of crime that are being targeted, and there is no restitutionary
effect; on the contrary, there is a substitution effect, whereby the proceeds
of crime – the revenue lost through fraud – are being collected from a third
party. In this context, most justifications and underlying considerations for
asset confiscation do not apply. There is no moral imperative, since the
crime was committed by a different party to that from whom the assets are
being confiscated. Similarly, there is no element of deterrence, prevention, or
restoration of the status quo; indeed, the collection of revenue from others may
create a moral hazard, resulting in an increase in the incidence of fraud. There
are therefore only two possible justifications for the existence of elements
akin to asset confiscation in anti-fraud policy: (1) remedy, to the extent that it
allows compensation to the state for the revenue lost through fraud – although
it does not compensate other victims of tax fraud, such as businesses who were
put at a competitive disadvantage; and (2) efficiency, since it allows a quick
recovery of the revenue lost through fraud, with minimal enforcement costs.
156 J. Boucht, The Limits of Asset Confiscation: On the Legitimacy of Extended
Appropriation of Criminal Proceeds (2017), at 5; C. King and C. Walker, ‘Emerging
Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets’ in Dirty Assets: Emerging
Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets eds C. King and C. Walker
(2014) 36, at 5.
157 R. Bowles et al., ‘Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains’ (2000) 20
International Rev. of Law and Economics 537.
158 J. Boucht, op. cit., n. 156, at 10; J. Hendry and C. King, ‘Expediency, Legitimacy,
and the Rule of Law: A Systems Perspective on Civil/Criminal Procedural Hybrids’
(2016) 10 Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, at 10.
159 M. Beare and F. Martens, ‘Policing Organised Crime: The Comparative Structures,
Traditions, and Policies within the United States and Canada’ (1998) 14 J. of
Contemporary Criminal Justice 398, at 415.
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The principle of third-party liability for tax fraud can therefore be
characterized as an instance of responsibilization with aggravating elements
that are more akin to asset confiscation. Yet even in their purest form, these
criminal justice trends have been subjected to intense scrutiny and their
legitimacy questioned. Non-conviction-based asset confiscation is regarded as
a paradigmatic example of the trend towards the hybridization of procedures,
in which civil procedures are used to target criminal behaviour.160 The
absence from civil proceedings of the procedural protections that are present
in criminal proceedings, however, has been said to threaten civil liberties
and the rule of law,161 as well as to create the risk of targeting legitimate
possessions, with potentially stigmatizing and reputational effects, and even
adverse personal effects, on those who have been subjected to it.162 Put in the
context of the principle of third-party liability for tax fraud, these concerns
are much more pronounced, as the features akin to non-conviction-based
asset confiscation are applied in conjunction with responsibilization. As a
result, the sanction is applied not to the fraudsters (there is no presumption
or pretence that the target is the proceeds of crime) but rather to third parties,
who have not themselves committed the crime – one that may have been
committed extrajurisdictionally or that may even have not yet been committed
at all. It is therefore third parties, not those who commit fraud, who feel
any potential financial, stigmatizing, reputational, or personal negative effects
resulting from the targeting of their property by tax authorities.
IV. FROM TAX FRAUD SUPPRESSION TO TAX FRAUD
MANAGEMENT
Anti-fraud measures, like other criminal law measures, have traditionally
centred primarily on a dual function: punishment and deterrence. The recent
legal and administrative developments discussed above have cast doubts over
the effectiveness of such measures. Increasing penalties has been shown to
have a limited deterrent effect on tax evasion; the emphasis on legal formalism
has resulted in the denial of tax rights even where there is no evidence or risk
of evasion; and the aggravated responsibilization of third parties for organized
tax fraud has meant that they are now liable even where they are only remotely
connected with the fraudster and there is no evidence or risk of fraud. Overall,
these measures are evidence of a shift in tax enforcement approaches, whereby
the main effect of anti-fraud measures, supposedly aimed at combating either
tax evasion or organized tax fraud, is no longer punishment or deterrence, but
160 A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, ‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the
Changing Character of Crime’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21.
161 Hendry and King, op. cit., n. 158, at 22. See also J. Sheptycki, ‘Global Law
Enforcement as a Protection Racket’ in Edwards and Gill (eds.), op. cit., n. 129, 42.
162 Boucht, op. cit., n. 156.
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rather the maximization of revenue gains, regardless of whether those gains
are the result of curtailing tax fraud or of the above measures being applied to
non-fraudsters.
These developments as regards tax fraud are reminiscent of wider
developments in criminal justice: a general move in crime control from
suppression to management. The main focus of anti-fraud policy now seems
to be oriented towards managing the revenue costs of tax fraud rather than
suppressing it. In many situations, the two will coincide: measures aimed
at addressing the revenue costs of fraud will have a positive effect in the
reduction of the incidences of tax fraud itself. This will not necessarily be the
case, however, and where the two diverge, pre-eminence is now consistently
being given to maximizing revenue, or minimizing the revenue costs of tax
fraud, to the detriment of eliminating fraud itself.
The question that then arises is: what has prompted this shift in tax law
enforcement? The answer seems to lie in a mixture of exogenous factors,
resulting to a large extent from the 2008/2009 financial crisis, and endogenous
factors, some of which are common to other areas of law enforcement.
The financial crisis gave rise to significant and widespread public finance
concerns, resulting in pressures for both an increase in revenues and a
reduction in expenditure. In many countries, such pressures resulted in two
concurrent policy effects: (1) the use of tax policy measures to increase
revenue, and (2) the introduction of austerity measures to reduce expenditure.
Both of these policy effects had an impact on anti-fraud policy.163 From a tax
policy perspective, the intensification of anti-fraud measures was perceived
as an obvious (and equitable) method of raising revenues without increasing
the tax burden on the overall population. From an expenditure perspective, the
imposition of austerity measures fuelled recognition of tax fraud as a crime,164
leading in turn to political economy pressures. Whilst little is known about the
electoral impact of anti-fraud measures, recent evidence indicates a positive
correlation between such measures and political gains: the implementation
of new anti-fraud measures increases the support for, and likelihood of re-
election of, political incumbents.165 Political gains are more pronounced in
areas with a lower self-reported tolerance for tax evasion and more efficient
public services, which may explain the higher intensity of anti-fraud initiatives
in some countries when compared to others.
Beyond public finance and political economy pressures, there are also
endogenous factors that can partially explain the shift evidenced in tax
163 Levi, op. cit., n. 27.
164 D. Wilks et al., ‘“Please Give Me an Invoice”: VAT Evasion and the Portuguese
Tax Lottery’ (2019) 39 International J. of Sociology and Social Policy. On how
perceptions of tax fraud have altered over time, see generally S. Karlinsky et al.,
‘Perceptions of Tax Evasion as a Crime’ (2004) 2 E-J. of Tax Research 226; G. S.
Moohr, ‘Tax Evasion as White Collar Fraud’ (2009) 9 Houston Business & Tax Law
J. 207.
165 Casaburi and Troiano, op. cit., n. 64.
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enforcement. Tax enforcement is costly, and the more organized the fraud
is, the more costly enforcement is likely to be. It is therefore common
– and natural – for tax administrations to assess the relative effectiveness
of a range of measures to encourage compliance: designing administrative
actions in light of enforcement elasticities or, more generally, of the marginal
revenue and costs associated with these actions is perceived as necessary for
optimal tax administration.166 The difficulty lies, however, in the fact that
these effectiveness assessments are based solely on cost–benefit analyses that
factor in only the short-term revenue results of tax administrations’ measures.
Revenue maximization is therefore used as a proxy for effectiveness,167
without consideration of other costs of fraud. Taking this approach can
easily lead to the maximization of revenues regardless of fraud itself; the
administrative costs of combating fraud are such that ‘dispensing with the
problems it poses’,168 namely revenue loss, is perceived as more effective.
Related to the focus on revenue maximization is the use of revenue
performance statistics and incentives. There is evidence that tax enforcement
activity has gravitated towards tackling the ‘low-hanging fruit’: tax authorities
are likely to focus on cases that increase their revenue but incur
low administrative costs, thus improving performance statistics.169 This
phenomenon is not exclusive to tax authorities; rather, it is part of a wider
trend in law enforcement agencies, whereby these agencies are evaluated
with reference to performance indicators.170 Where these indicators are
linked to performance incentives, the effects – and the risks – are amplified.
Such incentives have become commonplace within tax administrations
worldwide, with many applying performance-related pay or promotions,171
and have proven to be extremely successful in boosting revenues.172 There
is evidence that the application of performance-related pay may increase
166 M. Keen and J. Slemrod, ‘Optimal Tax Administration’ (2017) IMF Working Paper
WP/17/8, at 18. See also E. Crivelli, ‘A Basic Tool to Assess Tax Administration
Strength in Emerging Europe’ (2018) 26 Economics of Transition 1.
167 Y. Kuchumova, ‘The Optimal Deterrence of Tax Evasion: The Trade-Off between
Information Reporting and Audits’ (2017) 145 J. of Public Economics 162.
168 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-354/03, Optigen and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2005:89.
169 Braithwaite, op. cit., n. 63, at 200; D. Roche, ‘Tax Office Prosecutions: Firm and Fair
Regulatory Enforcement’ (2006) Australia National University Occasional Paper 9;
Malecka, op. cit., n. 142, at 260.
170 Garland, op. cit., n. 146, at 458.
171 A. Khan et al., ‘Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for
Tax Collectors’ (2016) 131 Q. J. of Economics 219, at 220. See also C. M. Kahn et al.,
‘Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform
and Its Effects’ (2001) 11 Economic J. 188; M. Holehouse, ‘I Deserve £20,000 Bonus,
Says HMRCChief’ Telegraph, 17 July 2014, at<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
personalfinance/tax/10972205/I-deserve-20000-bonus-says-HMRC-chief.html>.
172 F. Flatters and W. B. MacLeod, ‘Administrative Corruption and Taxation’ (1995) 2
International Tax and Public Finance 397.
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revenues by up to 40 per cent,173 whilst performance-related postings to
highly desirable locations may increase revenues by up to 80 per cent.174
There is also evidence of the reallocation of resources in response to the
introduction of performance incentives, to activities that will trigger those
incentives.175 This success comes, however, at a price: performance incentives
increase inspectors’ bargaining power, encouraging overzealous and improper
behaviour, including extortion and bribery.176
The impact of performance incentives within tax administrations is in line
with findings regarding other law enforcement agencies. There is significant
indication that the approval of asset confiscation legislation, which allowed
US police departments to keep part of the confiscated funds from drug-related
crimes, created revenue dependency177 and distorted police behaviour,178
leading some to argue that the notion of ‘policing for profit’ could not be
dismissed.179 Indeed, not only did the legislation lead to sharp increases
in drug arrests, but there was also evidence of associated costly negative
externalities, such as a 22 per cent increase in traffic fatalities, as resources
were reallocated from activities that were not rewarded with performance
incentives (traffic control) to those that were (drug control). Concerns over
these distortive effects were reportedly behind the decision taken in Canada
to distribute all financial gains resulting from asset confiscation amongst
the various divisions of the police force, rather than allowing those directly
connected to the case to keep all of the profits.180
Whilst the above factors explain the shift in tax enforcement from tax fraud
suppression to managing the revenue effects of fraud, the clear parallels with
other areas of criminal justice system also highlight the risks that such a shift
entails. Overall, there are two overarching concerns: (1) the risk of increasing
173 A. Khan et al., op. cit., n. 171.
174 A. Khan et al., ‘Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing
Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings’ (2018) NBER Working Paper
24383.
175 C. M. Kahn et al., op. cit., n. 171, at 204.
176 Khan et al., op. cit., n. 174; C. M. Kahn et al., op. cit., n. 171.
177 Beare and Martens, op. cit., n. 159; N. Taifa, ‘Civil Forfeiture versus Civil Liberties’
(1994) 39 New York Law School Rev. 95.
178 B. L. Benson et al., ‘Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs’
(1995) 83 Public Choice 21; B. D. Mas et al., ‘Entrepreneurial Police and Drug
Enforcement Policy’ (2000) 104 Public Choice 85; K. Baicher and M. Jacobson,
‘Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets’ (2007)
91 J. of Public Economics 2113.
179 S. Kantor et al., ‘Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence from
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984’ (2017) NBERWorking Paper 23873,
at 7; M. M. Cheh, ‘Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair?’
(1994) 39 New York Law School Rev. 1.
180 Beare and Martens, op. cit., n. 159. However, this was subsequently changed in some
Canadian provinces; see M. Levi, ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime: A New Code
for Confiscation?’ in Criminal Law Reform Now, eds J. Child and A. Duff (2018) 1.
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tax fraud, and all of the costs associated with it (beyond just revenue loss);
and (2) equally significantly, the risk to the rule of law.
There are two main reasons why tax fraud, and the non-revenue costs
resulting from it, can increase as a result of the shift in tax enforcement.181
The first is that eliminating the revenue costs of tax fraud – through increased
penalties, legal formalism, or aggravated responsibilization – removes the
incentives to combat tax fraud itself. Beyond the evidence regarding
reallocation of resources as a result of performance indicators and incentives,
there is also evidence that, even in the absence of these, the emergence of
new revenue streams can result in looser tax enforcement.182 The second
reason is that prioritizing the elimination of revenue costs, to the detriment
of combating fraud per se, decreases rather than increases deterrence by
creating a moral hazard. For tax fraudsters, impunity encourages re-incidence,
as it increases the expected value of the fraud; for non-fraudsters, perceived
inequity in the tax system encourages defiant non-compliance.183
The risk of this shift in tax enforcement to the rule of law is also significant.
The legitimacy of many of the criminal justice trends beyond the recent
developments in tax enforcement has long been questioned. Yet what is
happening within tax systems is much more extreme. The hybridization
of procedures is being applied not to address criminal behaviour but to
address some of the costs of that criminal behaviour; responsibilization is
not being applied per se but with features of asset confiscation, leading to
a new phenomenon of aggravated responsibilization. Furthermore, many of
these measures have been implemented not through legislation but through
administrative practice, and whilst it is generally accepted that tax authorities
need to employ some discretion in the exercise of their duties, that discretion
is subject to the limits resulting from legal and constitutional principles,
including the rule of law.184 The recent shift in tax enforcement, as much
a result of administrative discretion as of legislative developments, does not
respect the key principles from which it stems.
Even in a (narrower) formal conception, the rule of law imposes the respect
for principles that result in significant limitations on tax enforcement, not least
the principle that the discretion that law enforcement agencies possess should
181 E. Auriol and M. Warlters, ‘Taxation Base in Developing Countries’ (2005) 89 J. of
Public Economics 625; M. Keen, ‘Taxation and Development – Again’ in Studies of
Critical Issues in Taxation and Development, eds C. Fuest and G. Zodrow (2013) 13.
182 S. X. Chen, ‘The Effect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment in China’ (2017) 147 J. of Public Economics 62.
183 See Braithwaite, op. cit., n. 63. Here lies a key paradox in regulatory theory:
responsive regulation, to the extent that it concentrates on the revenue lost through
fraud, may itself increase non-compliance by creating perceptions of inequity,
undermining the cognitive reframing of tax morality on which it relies.
184 J. Freedman and J. Vella, ‘HMRC’s Management of the UK Tax System: The
Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion’, and D. de Cogan, ‘Tax, Discretion and the Rule
of Law’, in C. Evans et al. (eds.), The Delicate Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule
of Law (IBFD, 2011) 1–13 and 63–77.
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not be allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules,185 and
the principle that no one should be punishable or lawfully made to suffer in
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law.186 An anti-fraud policy that
gives precedence to minimizing the revenue costs of tax fraud or maximizing
revenue, rather than to combating tax fraud itself, inevitably leads to selective
tax enforcement. Whilst full tax enforcement is of course impossible to
achieve, selective enforcement based on maximization of revenue, rather than
minimization of tax fraud, runs counter to those two key corollary principles
of the rule of law. Ad extremis selective tax enforcement would allow tax
administrations to overlook the collection of a tax, imposed by law, that raised
low amounts of revenue but was costly to collect.187 At a fundamental level,
selective tax enforcement allows (tax) law to be sacrificed at the altar of
administrative tax effectiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
The last decade has witnessed the significant intensification of anti-fraud
policy both within Europe and elsewhere, with an upsurge in both legislative
and administrative measures that purportedly target different types of tax
fraud. Whilst many of these should be regarded as positive developments,
analysis of some of them – both those supposedly designed to address tax
evasion and those purportedly targeting organized tax fraud – unveils a crucial
shift in dominant approaches to tax enforcement, which, although in line
with those witnessed in other areas of crime control and the criminal justice
system, displays a fundamental lack of understanding of the phenomenon
of tax fraud and its costs. A mixture of exogenous and endogenous factors
have progressively and perniciously resulted in a situation whereby revenue
loss is taken as a proxy for tax fraud, and anti-fraud measures are designed
primarily not to deter or to punish fraud but rather to facilitate the recovery
of, or (failing that) to allow compensation for, the revenue that has been lost
through fraud. As in many other areas of the criminal justice system, tax fraud
has become a crime whose effects are to be managed, rather than a crime to
be suppressed. This has a profound effect upon our tax systems, which are
a cornerstone of our societies. Tax systems are dependent on enforcement
185 P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework’ (1997) Public Law 467. See also J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on
Law and Morality (2009) Chapter 11.
186 Craig, id. See also T. R. S. Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of
British Constitutionalism (1993), at 46.
187 This example is borrowed from J. Freedman and J. Vella, ‘Revenue Guidance: The
Limits of Discretion and Legitimate Expectations’ (2012) 128 Law Q. Rev. 192, at
195. It bares strong similarities to that reported in UK House of Commons Committee
of Public Accounts, Tackling Online VAT Fraud and Error, First Report of Session
2017–19, October 2017.
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as much as on policy.188 Selective tax enforcement that gives primacy to
revenue maximization and short-term efficiency concerns fatally damages the
neutrality and equity of our overall tax systems;189 it results in a decrease in
the long-term efficiency of those systems;190 and, crucially, it undermines the
rule of law, slowly corroding one of the core values upon which our societies
are based.
188 R. Bird, ‘Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform’ (2014) 15 Annals of Economic
Finance 963, at 963.
189 Freedman and Vella, op. cit., n. 187; Bird, id.
190 This is as a result of the theory of the second best; see R. Markovits, ‘The General
Theory of the Second Best and Economic Efficiency Analysis’ (2015) 49 Akron Law
Rev. 467.
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